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THE FOG OF WAR: CHECKS AND BALANCES AND
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
KENNETH WARD*
This Essay contends that the constitutional system of checks and
balances distorts democratic deliberation about issues of national se-
curity by integrating questions of security within a broader policy
agenda.  The relationship between security and other issues creates
incentives that make it less likely that officials will provide adequate
information about the risks facing the nation and will, instead, en-
courage people to view security in partisan terms such that policies
having little to do with security have undue influence on how we assess
questions of security.
More particularly, the Essay uses the War on Terror to illustrate
how checks and balances distort deliberation about security issues.  It
identifies political dynamics that would explain three shortcomings of
public discussions of President Bush’s security policies: (1) rather
than specify Iraq’s relationship to Islamic terrorism, President Bush
has pointed to September 11th and the possibility of a nuclear Iraq to
assert the high probability of additional  attacks; (2) his opponents
have sought to undercut public support for the Iraq War by emphasiz-
ing the policy’s high costs without adequately addressing Iraq’s rela-
tionship to Islamic terrorism; and (3) both President Bush and his
opponents assume that the War on Terror warrants a considerable
investment without clarifying the likelihood and magnitude of future
attacks.
In the aftermath of September 11th, Democrats had to maintain
a patriotic silence in order to sustain the appearance of bipartisan
unity.  This is not to say that Democrats did not want to support the
President as he defended the nation from a clear attack.  But they also
recognized that the political strength that presidents gain when the
nation unites has significant consequences for the broader partisan
agenda because presidents can use this strength to advance controver-
sial programs that have little to do with national defense.1  And just as
Copyright  2007 by Kenneth Ward.
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Texas State University.  I would like to
thank Karl DeRouen, Eric Mitchko, and Laylah Zurek for helpful comments.  I would espe-
cially like to thank Arnold Leder for his careful reading and helpful suggestions.
1. The popularity that a president tends to gain when the military is engaged overseas
is a political resource that can be employed to advance interests that the president chooses
36
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presidents might fight unjust wars to secure partisan ends, their oppo-
nents might challenge just wars for the same reason.  We are all sensi-
tive to the “wag the dog” problem, but it is easy to forget that tails wag
in two directions.
Cynicism is bipartisan.  If there is a temptation for one side to
engage in cynical behavior, the other side will have incentive to antici-
pate such behavior and engage in cynical behavior of its own. The
current political context invites such cynicism.  It is easy to believe that
(1) President Bush initiated a the Iraq War in order to sustain the
popularity he gained in responding to the September 11th attacks,
and (2) Democrats are attacking his policies in order to reverse the
recent partisan losses without regard to the dangers of Islamic terror-
ism.  In so believing, we ignore important possibilities.  President
Bush might have had good, non-partisan reasons for fighting the war,
even if the war also served partisan purposes, and his opponents
might be right in concluding that the war is a bad policy, even if they
do so for partisan reasons.
Cynicism, then, does more than express suspicion of why an offi-
cial pursues what seems to be a bad policy; it also indicates a deeper
problem.  Putting motives aside, we do not have adequate information
to assess security threats,2 and the constitutional system of checks and
balances gives elected officials various incentives to focus on the parti-
san implications of security policy.3  As a consequence, people tend to
assess security policy in light of its costs—especially the lost opportu-
nity to pursue other political goods—without an adequate under-
standing of the threats themselves.4
This is not to say that people value other goods more than na-
tional security.  We will see that although there are circumstances in
which officials have reason to emphasize the high costs of security pol-
to pursue. See PAUL BRACE & BARBARA HINCKLEY, FOLLOW THE LEADER 107 (1992) (discuss-
ing how the American public supports presidents when they use force abroad); Karl R.
DeRouen, Jr., The Indirect Link: Politics, the Economy, and the Use of Force, 39 J. CONF. RES. 671,
672 (1995) (alleging that leaders may use force abroad to boost short-term public support
at home); George C. Edwards III, Aligning Tests with Theory: Presidential Approval as a Source
of Influence in Congress, 24 CONGRESS & THE PRESIDENCY 113, 126–27 (1997) (arguing that a
president can use strong public approval to influence Congress); John E. Mueller, Presiden-
tial Popularity from Truman to Johnson, 64 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 18, 21 (1970) (describing how
Americans typically rally behind the president after international crises); see, e.g., RICHARD
E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP 104–05 (1960) (describing
how a period of success during the Korean War momentarily created support for one of
President Truman’s domestic policies).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 22–23. R
3. See infra text accompanying notes 13–15. R
4. See infra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. R
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icy, there are also circumstances in which they have reason to empha-
size security threats.
To begin, we should not be surprised that the system of checks
and balances encourages people to consider security in relation to
other political goods.  It is a structure of government that uses compe-
tition among factional interests to identify public goods that tran-
scend those interests.5  Each institution represents different
constituencies and has various capabilities that allow it to block poli-
cies that conflict with the interests of these constituencies.  Public
goods, according to this view, are those that a broad consensus of peo-
ple believes are consistent with their interests.
However, this system does not work well with security issues.  Peo-
ple lack information about the nature and scope of the threats they
face—information they must have if they are to effectively weigh se-
curity against other interests they might advance.  Indeed, there
would be no reason to put partisan differences aside and unite behind
presidents when they defended the country if we knew that those pres-
idents were pursuing security policies that were against our interests.
More particularly, given that people have limited information
about the dangers they face, officials will want to avoid the perception
that their policies put the nation at risk.  If we imagine the set of all
possible policy packages that officials might advance, each official has
reason to choose from the subset of packages that include a security
component that will make at least a majority of people feel protected.
Officials will have incentive to distinguish themselves by (1) convinc-
ing people that their opponents’ policies are outside of the subset of
acceptable packages;6 (2) favoring packages with security policies that
5. Because political parties have become the primary means for advancing factional
interests, I do not distinguish between factional and partisan interests.  The problem I
identify is a consequence of how the Constitution deals with factions and would continue
to be a problem even if there were no political parties.  It is the Constitution’s design that
gives officials incentive to build policy coalitions across issues.
6. Ronald Reagan, for example, was able to exploit the public’s perception that the
nation’s defenses were in decline, even as President Carter maintained military expendi-
tures at a level that matched a high rate of inflation. See Larry M. Bartels, Constituency
Opinion and Congressional Policy Making: The Reagan Defense Build Up, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
457, 461 (1991) (noting that a “pro-defense electorate” voted Reagan into office, and he
accordingly increased defense spending); Thomas Hartley & Bruce Russet, Public Opinion
and the Common Defense: Who Governs Military Spending in the United States?, 86 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 905, 911 (1992) (attributing the increase in defense spending during Reagan’s presi-
dency to public opinion); Robert Higgs & Anthony Kilduff, Public opinion: a powerful predic-
tor of U.S. defense spending, 4 DEF. ECON. 227, 235 (1993) (concluding that presidents have
some effect on molding public opinion regarding defense spending); Charles W. Ostrom
& Robin F. Marra, U.S. Defense Spending and the Soviet Estimate, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819,
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advance the interests of important constituencies;7 and (3) favoring
packages with non-security policies that advance the interests of such
constituencies.8
These incentives create various political dynamics that influence
the type of information people receive about threats the nation faces
and tend to distort public deliberation about national security.  This
Essay will consider these dynamics in three different contexts: (1) the
shorter term when the nation faces immediate threats; (2) an interme-
diate period in which those threats recede; and (3) the longer term in
which people consider security policies more generally.
I. THE SHORTER TERM: PRESIDENTS’ INCENTIVES IN RESPONDING TO
IMMEDIATE THREATS
In the face of immediate threats, presidents are uniquely situated
to defend the nation.9  Presidents have better information about the
837–39 (1986) (demonstrating that an increase in American defense spending paralleled
public concern that the Soviets were outspending the United States).
7. See Lawrence R. Jacobs & Benjamin I. Page, Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?, 99
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 107, 121 (2005) (using a recent study to argue that business interests
have considerable influence on American foreign policy).  During the early years of the
Cold War, for example, Republicans and Democrats divided on the proper balance be-
tween nuclear and conventional forces, and this division corresponded to the interests of
important constituencies.  Benjamin O. Fordham, Domestic Politics, International Pressure,
and the Allocation of American Cold War Military Spending, 64 J. POL. 63, 65–66 (2002).
8. Presidents have an incentive to advance the interests of constituents who are criti-
cal to their election.  They might do so by advancing the interests of particular regions or
interest groups that may influence the president’s electoral chances. See Kevin B. Grier et
al., Electoral Politics and the Executive Veto, 33 ECON. INQUIRY 427, 435 (1995) (concluding
that presidents will allocate funds, make appointments, and enact “regulatory favors” ac-
cording to electoral vote calculus); Nolan M. McCarty, Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power
and Distributive Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 117, 118 (2000) (noting that “the president
specifically targets spending toward areas that are important for his reelection”).  Constitu-
ents who believe that a president has advanced or will advance interests important to them
are likely to support that president even when he or she pursues policies that those constit-
uents consider less important.  There is some evidence that people who identify with a
particular party will switch policy positions as their parties do, especially when the issues
are difficult. See Elisabeth R. Gerber & John E. Jackson, Endogenous Preferences and the Study
of Institutions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 639, 654 (1993) (noting that institutions influence how
people develop and maintain their policy preferences); Robert Y. Shapiro & Benjamin I.
Page, Foreign Policy and the Rational Public, 32 J. CONF. RESOL. 211, 231 (1988) (explaining
that when the Republican party policy towards the Soviets shifted from hostility to peaceful
co-existence, Republican party identifiers provided substantial support throughout the
shift); Shoon Murray, Research Note, Turning an Elite Cross-Sectional Survey into a Panel Study
While Protecting Anonymity, 36 J. CONF. RES. 586, 586–88 (1992) (studying how certain Amer-
icans changed political perspectives after the Cold War ended).
9. John Mueller specified criteria for identifying events that correlate with people ral-
lying behind the president.  The events had to be international, directly involve the United
States and the president, and be “specific, dramatic, and sharply focused.” JOHN E. MUEL-
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dangers people face and the resources necessary to respond.  This
would explain why people rally behind presidents who combat such
dangers.10
Although presidents gain short-term popularity in responding to
immediate dangers, this popularity is fleeting.11  Sometimes the dan-
gers themselves are fleeting and partisanship reemerges as ordinary
politics return.12  In this circumstance, the popularity presidents gain
in defeating a threat is not enough to sustain a presidency.13  Without
the stimulus of an immediate threat, security becomes a more general
concern.  People will vote against presidents who they believe are not
capable of defending the nation.  However, they will otherwise assess
presidents in light of broader political considerations, ensuring that a
president’s partisan agenda will have great consequences for his or
her political fortune.14
On the other hand, presidents sometimes respond to immediate
dangers that recede without being eliminated.  Ordinary politics re-
turn as people become inured to lingering dangers, at which point
there is likely to be partisan debate about particular policies that ad-
dress those dangers.  Because presidents lose popularity as they pur-
sue extended conflicts,15 they have reason to seek partisan support to
help sustain their policies.
LER, WAR, PRESIDENTS AND PUBLIC OPINION 209 (1973).  For purposes of my analysis, there
need not be a clear line to mark when an immediate threat begins to recede.  The distinc-
tion is meant to identify conditions in which openly partisan criticisms of the president are
likely to be efficacious.
10. See DeRouen, supra note 1, at 672 (noting that leaders can boost short-term public R
support by responding to crises abroad); Mueller, supra note 1, at 21 (discussing the “rally R
round the flag” effect that accompanies the president’s response to major international
events).
11. See DeRouen, supra note 1, at 672; Robin F. Marra et al., Foreign Policy and Presiden- R
tial Popularity, 34 J. CONF. RESOL. 588, 619–20 (1990) (concluding that foreign policy action
influences short-term support).
12. Examples include conflicts in the Persian Gulf War, Panama, Haiti, and Grenada.
The immediate threat, therefore, need not be to the country as a whole.
13. See Mueller, supra note 1, at 21 (explaining that some threats do not create a rally-
ing effect for the president because they do not hold the public’s attention).
14. Some evidence suggests that when disagreement occurs over a president’s policy,
the policy’s short term success can influence how people perceive the two parties over the
longer term, including how the parties respond to potential threats. See, e.g., Barbara Nor-
rander & Clyde Wilcox, Rallying Around the Flag and Partisan Change: The Case of the Persian
Gulf War, 46 POL. RES. Q. 759, 768 (1993) (noting that the Republican Party gained sup-
port in 1991 partially because of President Bush’s actions during the Persian Gulf War).
15. John Mueller, American Public Opinion and Military Ventures Abroad: Attention,
Evaluation, Involvement, Politics, and the Wars of the Bushes, Address Before the 2003
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Aug. 13, 2003), available at
http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSA2003.PDF (explaining that Americans are
willing to abandon conflicts when the stakes seem unworthy of additional American lives)
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While presidents have reason to formulate security policies with
an eye to their partisan agenda, this does not mean that they exagger-
ate or manufacture threats in order to attract partisan support.  But
these partisan incentives lead presidents to take actions that make it
difficult for people to fully understand the threats that face the na-
tion.  Consider two tendencies that may follow from these incentives.
First, rather than explain why a policy is appropriate given the
nature or scope of a threat, presidents have reason to use the exis-
tence of the threat as a justification for the policy.16  Actual justifica-
tions would legitimize public discussion of that policy.  And while
presidents can control such discussion in the shorter term, when a
united people will punish openly partisan behavior, over time a presi-
dent’s justification is likely to become the subject of partisan debate.17
As the threat recedes, a president’s opponents can distinguish them-
selves on security issues by attacking particular security policies.  And
detailed policy justifications expose presidents to these attacks.
Moreover, presidents who anticipate the return of partisan polit-
ics will want to avoid wasting political resources on a policy that will
already have broad support.  They will , instead, use these resources to
build alliances to help them stay in office and increase their power.18
[hereinafter American Public Opinion and Military Ventures Abroad]; John Mueller, Fif-
teen Propositions about American Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in an Era Free of
Compelling Threats, Address Before the National Convention of the International Studies
Association (Apr. 16–20, 1996), available at http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/isa
1996.pdf (suggesting that Americans become concerned with international issues only
briefly after a crisis or threat) [hereinafter Fifteen Propositions].  Mueller’s examples in-
clude the Korean and Vietnam Wars.  But Mueller notes that presidents can pursue an
extended engagement, such as a peacekeeping mission, so long as the costs remain low.
For Mueller, casualties are the most significant cost. See Public Opinion and Military Ven-
tures Abroad, supra, at 11–12.
16. Some events seem to speak for themselves.  The Soviet Union’s explosion of a nu-
clear bomb, Berlin blockade, and invasion of Czechoslovakia hardened public opinion in
favor of the Cold War.  Shapiro & Page, supra note 8, at 225.  And later events such as the R
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Hostage Crisis created a similar sentiment
for strengthening national defenses. Id. at 242.
17. Posner and Vermeule identify strategies that well-meaning executives can use to
increase their credibility when they act in the name of emergencies and national security.
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive (John M. Olin Law & Economics
Working Paper No. 309, 2006), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.
html.  But there is a deeper structural problem in that security policies will be associated
with broader policy agenda whether or not those policies are well motivated, and people
will have an incentive to assess those policies in partisan terms, even if they believe them to
be well motivated.  As a consequence, well-motivated presidents still have reason to invest
political resources in building partisan support for their policies rather than in convincing
people of their good intentions.
18. See supra note 8. R
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By advancing a partisan agenda, they give people a greater stake in
their presidencies, making it easier to sustain their policies.
And this suggests a second tendency that distorts public under-
standing of threats to the national security: as a president’s security
policy becomes part of a broader policy agenda, it becomes difficult
for people to disentangle the policy package and consider a particular
security policy on its own merits, a difficulty that is compounded when
a president has not provided an adequate policy justification.  This is
not to say that partisanship will make it impossible for people to de-
tect flawed or failed security policies.19  But their stake in a president’s
success will lead them to be more favorably disposed toward those pol-
icies20 than they otherwise would, or in some circumstances support
those policies in order to preserve the president’s strength to fight
other partisan battles.
President Bush has used each of these strategies to sustain sup-
port for the Iraq War.  Rather than discuss the nature of the threat
posed by terrorism and Iraq’s relationship to that threat, he sought to
associate people’s recent experience of a terrorist attack with an un-
stable dictator who was either pursuing or likely to pursue weapons of
mass destruction.21  He had reason to pursue this course, given the
nature of the evidence necessary to justify the Iraq War and the weak-
ened position of his political opponents.22
The link between Iraq and the War on Terror seems to follow
from inferences we might draw about (1) the relationship of instabil-
ity in the Middle East to Islamic terrorism, (2) the relationship of Iraq
19. People also switch their partisan affiliation in response to changes in how they per-
ceive the parties.  Richard A. Brody & Lawrence S. Rothenberg, The Instability of Partisan-
ship, 18 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 445, 464–65 (1988).
20. See Larry M. Bartels, Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions, 24
POL. BEHAV. 117, 138 (2002) (concluding that partisan bias in political perceptions rein-
forces and perpetuates differences in opinion between Republicans and Democrats) [here-
inafter Beyond the Running Tally].  There is some evidence that partisans will switch
positions as their parties do, especially when the issues are difficult.  See Gerber & Jackson,
supra note 8, at 654; Murray, supra note 8, at 587; Shapiro & Page, supra note 8, at 231. R
21. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK 16–17 (2006) (explaining that
President Bush successfully framed the Iraq War as another battle in the ongoing War on
Terror to gain support from the public and Congress); Press Release, Office of the White
House Press Secretary, President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have
Ended, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-15.
html (framing the battle in Iraq as a key part of the ongoing War on Terror).
22. President Bush’s opponents were weakened because an attack against the country
is the type of event that unites people in the belief that a response is necessary and that it is
the president who is responsible for directing the response. See Shapiro & Page, supra note
8, at 233–36 (discussing how various wars united support behind the president).  Indeed, R
the Iraq War is the type of event from which presidents derive a rallying effect. See MUEL-
LER, supra note 9, at 209 (discussing the qualities of a rallying event). R
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to instability in the Middle East, and (3) the relationship of Iraq to
Islamic terrorism.  The justification for war in Iraq, according to this
view, would depend on how these relationships influence the physical
and economic security of the United States.  A reasonable assessment
would require a detailed understanding of how Saddam Hussein’s re-
gime contributed to Middle Eastern instability, including what we
might have expected from an Iraq that, while significantly weakened,
had begun to escape the shackles put in place after the first Iraq War.
More significantly, we should recall that in the aftermath of Sep-
tember 11th the Democrats were in a weak position to challenge the
War on Terror, and the best they could do was to question the strate-
gies used to prosecute it.23  By offering a detailed policy justification,
President Bush would have invited public discussion that would make
his policy a legitimate subject of partisan debate.24  And such a debate
would have diverted the resources he could otherwise use to advance
the interests of constituencies that might play an important role in his
reelection and help him to sustain his policy.
II. THE INTERMEDIATE PERIOD: PARTISANSHIP RETURNS IN THE WAKE
OF A RECEDING THREAT
Although there will be a different political dynamic as an immedi-
ate threat recedes and the danger becomes more speculative, it is a
dynamic that reinforces the two problems associated with the earlier
time: (1) security policies are not adequately justified, and (2) people
23. See MUELLER, supra note 9, at 208 (explaining that people rally around the execu- R
tive in response to a foreign policy crisis).  Almost seven years after the attack, we still see
evidence of this weakness.  For example, when John Edwards recently criticized the War on
Terror, saying it has amounted to nothing more than a slogan, he spurred debate among
leading candidates for the presidential nomination of the Democratic Party.  Michael
Cooper & Patrick Healy, Is the U.S. Safer Since 9/11? Clinton and Rivals Spar, N.Y. TIMES, Jun.
6, 2007, at A1.  While candidates disagree about whether the country is safer and who is
responsible for the country being safer, they did not discuss whether there was a need for a
major policy initiative to make the country safer or the exact nature of the threat we face.
The candidates seem to take it as given that there is a problem that the Bush Administra-
tion should have responded to, and the debate seems to be about the adequacy of the
policies that responded to that threat. Id.
24. See Charles W. Ostrom & Dennis M. Simon, The President’s Public, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI.
1096, 1101 (1988) (explaining that partisanship influences citizens’ view of presidential
decisions); see also Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., The Dynamics of Political Support for American Presi-
dents Among Occupational and Partisan Groups, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 312, 322–24 (1982) (dis-
cussing the partisan response to the Vietnam War and its negative effect on President
Johnson’s approval ratings).  There is a deep partisan divide over both the Iraq War and
the Bush presidency, although the divide narrowed considerably after the September 11th
attacks.  John Mueller, The Iraq Syndrome, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 44, 49 (2005).  President Bush,
therefore, had reason to frame the policy as a response to terrorism so as to dampen parti-
san criticism and, to a considerable extent, this tactic succeeded.
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have reason to consider them as part of a broader policy package.
The absence of an adequate justification would explain why people
focus on the costs of security policies both in lives and resources.25
Moreover, by linking particular security policies to a partisan agenda,
presidents invite people to consider those policies in light of their op-
portunity costs26—whether the resources invested in those policies
would be better invested elsewhere.27  Countervailing political forces
should move the status quo towards a policy package that encom-
passes a broader range of interests, as those left out of the incumbent
president’s coalition pursue policies that take better account of their
interests.28
A president’s opponents will challenge particular security policies
in a way that would not be tolerated while the nation was in immedi-
ate danger, and many people will assess these challenges in partisan
terms.29  While those with a stake in the president’s success will be
more receptive to his or her arguments, or will have some reason to
favor policies they would otherwise believe unjustified, there is likely
25. See Fifteen Propositions, supra note 15 (explaining that Americans assess the proba- R
ble and potential American casualties when evaluating a war); Miroslav Nincic, Domestic
Costs, the U.S. Public, and the Isolationist Calculus, 41 INT’L. STUD. Q. 593, 606–07 (1997)
(concluding that the public weighs opportunity cost when making foreign policy
evaluations).
26. See Nincic, supra note 25, at 606–07. R
27. The claim about the distribution of costs is not limited to monetary losses.  For
example, we know that strong proponents of a woman’s right to choose are likely to vote
against Republicans, and the association of the Iraq War with the Republicans’ domestic
agenda will lead them to focus on the immediate costs of the war and reject the policy
package as a whole.  Although some might support the war if it were associated with differ-
ent domestic policies, this is not likely given the nature of our two-party system.  The sali-
ence of a war makes it difficult to disassociate the war from the president who chooses to
fight it.  In this circumstance, people would have reason to view the President’s ability to
advance his domestic agenda as a cost of the war.  In 2004, for example, pro-choice voters
who supported the Iraq War should have known or even knew that supporting the war
increased the likelihood that President Bush would be able to appoint pro-life judges.
28. My argument resembles Almond’s criticism of a fickle public that overreacts to im-
mediate events and then loses interest in international affairs once those events recede. See
generally GABRIEL ALMOND, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND FOREIGN POLICY 53 (7th ed. 1967)
(exploring how various segments of society react to foreign policy).  But this is only a su-
perficial resemblance.  I do not argue that the public loses interest in international events
or that it assigns too much weight to domestic affairs.  My argument is consistent with the
considerable literature that refutes Almond, including Shapiro and Page’s claim that the
public is not capricious, but acts rationally given the information that it has received.  Sha-
piro & Page, supra note 8, at 243.  I attribute the inadequacy of this information to incen- R
tives created by the system of checks and balances.  These same incentives explain the
findings of both Mueller and Nincic, each of whom claims that the public assesses security
policies based on the costs of those policies. See supra note 25. R
29. See Ostrom & Simon, supra note 24, at 1101 (explaining that a president’s oppo- R
nents normally view the president’s actions through a skeptical lens).
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to be a large number of people who would prefer a different policy
package.  This is because by initiating security policy, presidents form
narrower coalitions than would have arisen if the same policy had
been initiated by Congress.
Recall that the system of checks and balances is committed to
broad-based policy making.  The legislative process reflects this com-
mitment in that it contains various veto points at which people can
block policies that threaten their interests, thus broadening public
support for government policy.  Presidents avoid this process when
they initiate security policy.  Legislators, as a consequence, do not
have an opportunity to block a president’s policy that would nega-
tively impact programs that are important to particular constituencies.
Given that major policy legislation tends to require broader support
than it takes to elect a president,30 it is likely that Congress would not
approve such a policy unless it were part of a different policy package.
For example, once people have a clearer sense of both the costs of a
security policy and also the distribution of those costs, namely the cuts
in government programs necessary to pay for the policy, a coalition of
interests would likely form to defeat the policy package containing the
president’s security policy.
In these circumstances, it seems that presidents would have an
incentive to bring forth more information to justify their policies.  But
such information is likely to be less effective rhetorically than a re-
newed appeal to people’s fleeting memory of a past but very real dan-
ger.  The problem is that any justification would be speculative in that
the danger might never arise again or that it will have a disproportion-
ate effect on some people over others—younger people, for example,
would be far more likely to suffer than older people.  By contrast, a
president’s opponents could point to the immediate costs of the poli-
cies that combat a potential danger.
Consider an analogous case: the government’s difficulty in re-
sponding to impending environmental catastrophes.  In the absence
30. See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 117–18 (1990) (ex-
plaining that large legislative majorities are necessary to overcome majoritarian tests);
KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS 5–6 (1998) (noting that winning legislative coalitions
are normally larger than the minimum votes necessary to win).  This argument assumes
that initiating armed conflict is analogous to issuing executive orders, as both are methods
that presidents may use to set policy in a manner that circumvents the legislative process.
Deering and Maltzman have found that presidents can successfully pursue this strategy as
long as the legislature is sufficiently divided so that the opposition cannot build the
supermajority necessary to override a president’s veto.  Christopher J. Deering & Forrest
Maltzman, The Politics of Executive Orders: Legislative Constraints on Presidential Power, 52 POL.
RES. Q. 767, 777–78 (1999).
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of immediate experience, it is hard for people to grasp good evidence
about the likelihood of disaster, especially when many people have
reason to think they can avoid the danger.31  And though immediate
weather events—such as a recent trend of stronger and more frequent
storms—have limited evidentiary value, they are more likely to con-
vince people of the dangers of global warming than scientific accounts
of a looming environmental calamity, and this continues to be the
case even as the memories of those events fade.32  The problem is
further complicated because those with interests opposed to remedial
policies have both the incentive and the ability to make the costs of
those policies clear.33
This is not to say that a president’s policy is deficient because it
lacks the broader support demanded by the system of checks and bal-
ances.  Indeed, our instinct to unite behind presidents in the face of
danger suggests that we value security more than other goods and
thus have reason to consider security policy in isolation from partisan
interests.  And one reason to do so is that our deliberations about se-
curity become distorted when people receive better information
about the costs of particular policies than the dangers those policies
seek to address.
We see this problem as Democrats challenge President Bush’s
policy in Iraq.  Recall that the September 11th attacks placed the
Democrats in the position of a loyal opposition.34  To regain power,
they had to wait for the President to make a mistake in prosecuting
the war or for the return of ordinary politics, a time when they could
win elections by distinguishing themselves from Republicans on issues
not related to security.  President Bush, therefore, had reason to avoid
a detailed justification for the Iraq War.  Such a justification would
legitimate partisan discussion of security policy and thereby divert po-
litical resources from partisan ends that would, over the longer term,
strengthen his presidency and thus help sustain a broader political
agenda that included the Iraqi policy itself.
Time has proved that President Bush needed partisan support to
sustain what has been a costly policy.  Democrats have made gains by
31. Sheldon Ungar, The Rise And (Relative) Decline Of Global Warming As A Social Problem,
33 SOCIOLOGICAL Q. 483, 488–89 (1992).
32. Id. at 996–97.
33. Center for Responsive Politics, Oil & Gas: Long Term Contribution Trends, http:/
/www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.asp?Ind=E01 (reporting that oil and gas compa-
nies donated almost twenty million dollars to political candidates during the 2006 election
cycle and over twenty-five million during the 2004 cycle).
34. Christopher Marquis, The War Wagon: Democrats Play the Loyal Opposition, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 2002, at D5.
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emphasizing these costs, and we see that, to a considerable extent,
people’s assessment of the policy corresponds to their partisan prefer-
ences.35  More significantly, while the 2006 election looked as if it
would mark the beginning of the end of the Iraq War36 and perhaps
also reverse whatever partisan advantage President Bush was able to
secure from the policy, we should consider how much our delibera-
tions have been shaped by the costs of the policy and how little atten-
tion we pay to the relationship among events in Iraq, instability in the
Middle East, and the threat of Islamic terrorism.
It would seem that President Bush would have had greater incen-
tive to justify the Iraq War as the costs of his policy mounted, but we
can see why he would avoid making his justification a subject for de-
bate.  Our struggles with environmental policy suggest that convincing
evidence has much less influence when processed through a partisan
filter,37 and, by its nature, the evidence that would support the Iraq
War is much more speculative than the evidence about environmental
dangers.38  Rather than probabilities derived from facts, we are faced
with competing interpretations of history.
In our current situation, both Republicans and Democrats are
likely to view the justification through partisan lenses, given that they
are interested interpreters of such evidence.  Democrats, however,
have an advantage in making their case to non-partisans; they can
point to high costs that are readily apparent, while Republicans can
offer only theoretical conclusions about highly contestable evidence.
Moreover, the September 11th attacks continue to be a significant,
though receding, presence in the public psyche.  President Bush
seems to have decided to avoid a debate that will bring added atten-
tion to a costly policy.  This strategy will prove sound if divisions
among the electorate and the partisan gains of the past six years help
him to sustain the policy.
35. See Ostram & Simon, supra note 24, at 1101. R
36. The Democrats’ victory is widely seen as a rejection of President Bush’s policy.
Alan Cowell, Reactions From Abroad Set Conciliatory Tone, Seeing Vote as a Protest to Iraq Policy,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at A29; Adam Nagourney, Narrow Victory by G.O.P. Signals Fall
Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 8, 2006, at A1; Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Mark Mazzetti, Democrats
Push for Troop Cuts Within Months, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2006, at A1.  This is not to say,
however, that President Bush will not be able to sustain the war in the short run or in the
longer run if he is able to significantly reduce the number of American casualties. See
Fifteen Propositions, supra note 15, at 7 (finding that public support is a function of Ameri- R
can casualties).
37. See Beyond the Running Tally, supra note 20 (explaining that partisan bias affects how R
people interpret information).
38. See supra text accompanying notes 22–23. R
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III. THE LONGER TERM: OVERINVESTMENT IN GENERAL SECURITY
POLICY
The Democrats have challenged the Iraq War by pointing to the
high costs of President Bush’s policy.39  By contrast, they have done
comparatively little to challenge his decision to fight a war against ter-
rorism, and the lack of discussion of this more general policy commit-
ment is noteworthy.  It is indicative of a third political dynamic that
characterizes longer-term security policy: checks and balances create
an institutional bias that leads partisans of all stripes to spend too
much money on national security.
In the absence of information about the immediate costs of a par-
ticular security policy, it becomes harder for people to see the trade-
offs between the resources allocated to security and those allocated to
other political goods.  People know that savings from security can be
used to advance other interests, but they disagree about how to dis-
tribute those savings. More significantly, people also believe that other
government programs should be cut before security, though they disa-
gree about which programs to cut.
As a consequence, proponents of defense spending can focus the
debate on the narrower question of which programs should be cut
before security and thereby avoid the broader question of whether we
are spending too much on security and whether we would be better
off redistributing money from security to other programs.40  This strat-
egy is made more effective because politicians can use real—if uncer-
tain—threats to reinforce people’s tendency to support security
expenditures, and can point to the absence of an immediate threat to
prove the efficacy of existing security policy.
Moreover, both presidents and legislators have incentive to over-
value security.  Presidents have institutional reasons to be risk averse
because they play a primary role in formulating and implementing
security policies and voters hold them responsible for those policies.41
39. See Carl Hulse, Democrats Step Up Attacks on Iraq War, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2003, at
A10 (reporting Democrats’ criticism of the monetary costs of the Iraq War); Jeff Zeleny &
Michael Luo, A Divided House Denounces Plan for More Troops, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2007, at
A1 (reporting on the formal resolution the House of Representatives passed that criticized
President Bush’s decision to send additional combat troops to Iraq, partially based on the
cost of the war).
40. This would explain Russet’s finding of few tradeoffs between military spending and
expenditures on domestic programs.  Bruce Russett, Defense Expenditures and National Well-
being, 76 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 767, 774–75 (1982).
41. See Tom R. Tyler, Personalization in Attributing Responsibility for National Problems to the
President, 4 POL. BEHAV. 379, 394–95 (1982) (finding that people attribute personal respon-
sibility to the president for national problems).
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While legislators will seek to avoid a reputation for being weak on
security,42 they also have partisan reasons for supporting the security
choices that presidents make.  Presidents have considerable influence
over the national policy agenda and can link their security policies to
partisan goods that have great significance to legislators’ reelection,
such as defense contracts that favor industry in a particular district.
Over time, therefore, the dynamics of elections should create up-
ward pressure on security spending.43  We have seen that presidents
and presidential candidates have an incentive to choose from the set
of policy packages that will not make them vulnerable to attack for
being weak on security.44  But that set is likely to be fluid given that
there will be times in which presidential candidates can identify plau-
sible threats to justify policy packages weighted more heavily to secur-
ity.  In so doing, they place their opponents in the difficult position of
having to prove the absence of danger or risk being perceived as weak
on security.  While these opponents are likely to reject the new policy
package, they will want to undercut the distinction that other candi-
dates are trying to draw and will do so by advancing policies that invest
more in security than the policies they otherwise would have favored.
At this point, presidents will have to choose from a set of policy pack-
ages that is more heavily weighted to security than the original set.
Consider again how deliberations about the Iraq War have been
characterized by almost no detailed discussion of the nature of the
threat terrorism poses or how it compares to other dangers the gov-
ernment might address.45  In challenging President Bush’s policies,
the Democrats have questioned the Iraq War and some limited costs
associated with the broader War on Terror, such as particular policies
relating to domestic surveillance.46  But Democrats have shown little
inclination to question the need for a war on terrorism as a response
42. See, e.g., Bartels, supra note 6, at 461 (noting that when President Reagan requested R
Congress to appropriate twenty-six billion dollars more to defense than President Carter
requested, Congress responded by exceeding President Reagan’s request).
43. This is not to say that defense spending will never go down.  Events such as the
collapse of the Soviet Union or the end of the Vietnam War led to periods in which peo-
ple’s perception of external dangers resulted in downward adjustments in defense
spending.
44. See, e.g., Richard W. Stevenson, Bush Attacks Kerry as Weak on Security, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 2004, at A13.
45. American Public Opinion and Military Ventures Abroad, supra note 15, at 6 n.8 R
(noting the lack of any comparative calculus of the danger terrorism poses after 9/11 and
citing a study finding that the chance of being killed on a non-stop flight is about one in 13
million, while to reach the same level of risk while driving, one would only have to travel
11.2 miles).
46. See David Johnston & Michael Janofsky, Defending a Program and His Reputation, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006, at A24.
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to the September 11th attacks, even though this is a war that will entail
significant costs for the foreseeable future.47
It would be surprising if either Democrats or Republicans did so.
In challenging the War on Terror, politicians would have to make
contestable and speculative arguments.  In so doing, they would ex-
pose themselves to opponents eager to emphasize the high costs of
terrorism to a risk-averse electorate.  Indeed, we already know that
they will draw on the example of September 11th to do so and will
give little or no explanation of why they think a similar or more dan-
gerous attack is likely.  Moreover, given the likelihood that there will
be terrorist attacks regardless of the security policy officials imple-
ment, all officials have an incentive to appear aggressive in combating
terrorism—if only to inoculate themselves against future attacks from
partisan opponents.  There will always be ambitious politicians willing
to reinforce people’s fears by encouraging doubt about the adequacy
of existing security measures.  As a consequence, we should expect
officials to remain bullish on the War on Terror.  But it will be surpris-
ing if they justify the investment.
47. See Cooper & Healy, supra note 23.  Balkin and Levinson contend that there is a bi- R
partisan view of what they call the National Surveillance State that they believe is a re-
sponse to terrorism, but also derives from social forces that pre-date 9/11.  Jack M. Balkin
& Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the
National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 532–33 (2006).  My argument identifies
structural phenomena that explain this tendency.
